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The End of Republican Governance and the Rise
of Imperial Cities
José María Monzón
University of Buenos Aires School of Law
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper seeks to demonstrate how select cities—henceforth referred to
as Imperial Cities—are able, via the accumulation of various kinds of
wealth, to construct political and social power that is competitive with that
of the state within which these cities are located. The association of this
political and social power with affluence results in the transformation of the
state’s social hierarchy structure as well as the transformation of access to
legal protection within these cities and in the rest of the state. In turn, this
merging of political power with the metropolitan social structure gives
Imperial Cities a number of general traits. First, they have a leading role in
dictating the state’s national policy, mostly on subjects that concern the
invisible frontiers that divide affluent societies from poor societies. Second,
Imperial Cities—more so than elsewhere in the state—are preoccupied with
wealth as an identifier of the ruling elite. In particular, an Imperial City
citizen’s individual consumption is a test of his or her rank in the social
hierarchy. Third, Imperial Cities contain inner circles of power, free of real
obstacles based on race, gender, religion, or political opinion, and only
wealth keeps their members united. Fourth, public debates on rights are
functional to Imperial Cities’ policies because these discussions conceal the
actual gap in the real satisfaction of individual rights.
The outcome of this situation is the growth of dual sources of power: one
that rests in the Imperial Cities and another that resides with states as a
whole. Thus, the existence of republican governance masks the real
structure of political power; in this way, the existence of Imperial Cities
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represents a critical threat to true representative democracy. On one hand,
the existence of these cities means that the old concept of sovereignty based
on territory has become an empty term. While sovereignty was thought of
as an essential element of the state, the entire political discourse was
centered on the importance of the dominion of the geographical space. But
with the rise of Imperial Cities, political discourse tends to pay attention to
information because information is a relevant capital for the transnational
elite to build structures of power. The function of political and economic
information is crucial within the finance world; territory is not as significant
as it was in past decades, and geographical space is substituted by virtual
space that is construed on information. On the other hand, political
discourse praises representative government as a useful instrument to
support the state’s role—mainly through federalism—and citizens’
aspirations to equal access to rights; it is a “keep the customer satisfied”
policy. Within these cities there is an extended offer of rights, but relatively
few citizens can benefit from them. In this way, Imperial Cities compete
with the power of the state because their wealthy, transnational elite not
only control the market, but they also dominate the systems that maintain
social order—essentially creating a peaceful contemporary oligarchy.
Because this oligarchy is contained within a widespread set of metropolises,
this oligarchy can also function as a sort of imperialism of capitalism in
which its members have heightened rights and citizenship status.
The Imperial Cities, as this article conceives of them, are a modern
cultural phenomenon. Their importance rests mainly in their capability to
influence state policy and to form a type of imperialism with both local and
international effects. Mostly, these effects are achieved through peaceful
means, usually through a domination of culture and knowledge. In order to
define an Imperial City, we must identify some common characteristics.
The most immediate of these are: (1) a large population (perhaps the most
visible characteristic and necessarily the most defining one), (2) a harbor
location (usually), (3) its recognition as an important commercial and
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financial center, (4) a transnational elite, and (5) a way of life that forms a
shared identity for all the city’s inhabitants. These key features can expand
with the help of different structures of power: cultural, political, economic,
and especially educational. Altogether, they form a global structure of
cultural dominance and a corresponding colonial system in select fields of
study. Military dominance becomes a last resort, limited to a determined
space. Ultimately, Imperial Cities act as microstates (states within states),
always in search of opportunities to shape state policy. What defines
modern Imperial Cities is their role as microstates; but this also
distinguishes them from the role once played by Athens, Rome, Paris, and
London (although some similarities can be found, as we shall examine
later).
From a macrolevel perspective, an Imperial City’s form of dominance
can only develop through a formal democratic system which gives an
appearance of equal access, participation, and distribution of power.1 In the
assumption of democracy as a general political formula for all states, there
exists the role given to constitutions in modern legal systems, whose
importance relies on the rights bestowed to citizens and on the legal
limitations of state power. A balance of limitations on state power—whose
main example is the état de siege2—with citizen rights and freedoms often
represents a pragmatic, Janus-faced political formula. Like the power
structure created in the beginning of the Roman Empire to support the
power of the emperor behind a republican mask, such a formula is a means
to solve serious political problems of authority and governance but still
maintain a structure of contemporary power. However, diverse historical
events—such as widespread wars or economic and financial crises—of the
last centuries drove states to concentrate power and to give relevance to
determined cities where crucial decisions were made, a process which
seems both prudent and natural.3 This transfer of state power to these
centers of political, economic, and financial importance gave birth to the
Imperial Cities.
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From a microlevel context, it is observed that these cities are built as
locations for a new, ruling elite. Imperial Cities are not homogenous places;
but they still contain inner microcities—places that once were quarters
without borders and now are closed quarters—like those that can be seen in
Latin America.4 These microcities are quarters—often placed in the
outskirts of main cities—where wealthy people gather with schools and
supermarkets, protected by private security agents.5 While Imperial Cities
can form microstates, it is the microcities that actually contain the Imperial
City elite in their domestic capacity. These microcities demonstrate the
fragmentation of space through invisible limits—a conception used by
Santos6—where people gather based on a criterion of wealth.7 This
arrangement further compromises the real existence of an egalitarian society
as it is usually conceived.
Combining both levels of analysis reveals a community which outwardly
projects a common way of life and a shared identity but which is internally
fragmented by tangible yet invisible boundaries. These boundaries project
themselves beyond the city limits via the Imperial City’s structure of
dominance, political influence, and cultural colonialism. This structure is
spread by the ruling elites, mostly through education and mass
communication. The creation of the necessary conditions for the
construction of Imperial Cities as microstates also suggests a process which
began centuries ago.
The first section of this paper presents a study of the Imperial Cities’
genealogy as a means to understand what has happened to create the present
situation. The second section describes how this situation has led to the
construction of a stratified notion of citizenship in which the elite benefit
from effective entitlement of rights regardless of citizenship while the rest
of the population only retains an illusion of these entitlements. Next, the
paper explains how capitalism (used here as the pursuit of wealth) dictates
the laws and moral norms of Imperial Cities, thus achieving the goals of the
affluent society while allowing the disenfranchisement of those without
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wealth. As a result of this capitalist worldview and its resulting norms,
consumerism has emerged as a new means of control, with the scope of
one’s citizenship and rights being defined by how much one can consume.
Access to education and market information, this paper then argues, are
essential to maintaining one’s wealth and hence one’s rights. The last
section explores how these circumstances have formed a mask of republican
governance in order to allow oligarchies to continue to exert political
control without risking revolution.

II. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE IMPERIAL CITIES
For many decades, if not centuries, the notion of the modern industrial
metropolis has captured the attention of many prominent social scientists
and commentators.8 Diverse and contradictory theories and views have been
proposed, but some general descriptive elements exist.9 Paris and London,
during the modern age, collaborated to shape the political power of France
and England, as once did Athens and Rome for their empires.10 The ancient
ruling oligarchies proved to be a model for other emerging ruling classes,
their main goal being to act on behalf of the state, kingdom, or empire.11 In
this way, cultural, political, and legal systems were related to each other
through a common set of problems and methods of resolution. In fact, there
are five general methods of resolution to common problems found in
Imperial Cities: (1) egalitarianism, (2) the establishment of formal
freedoms, (3) legalism, (4) parliamentarianism, and (5) educational
colonialism.
Egalitarianism, as a common source of resolution, is a popular political
slogan. It is an appeal to extend to all human beings the possibility to
release or compensate for their natural and artificial differences, in order to
achieve an original situation of full equality. It is also a means to achieve
social peace and common welfare. In practice, however, most of the
differences are accepted, reproduced, and supported by the social system.
The solution to these contexts is thought to come from legal norms, though
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history demonstrates that such relief is limited. Rome is the best example of
this situation. Invasions from the east pushed non-Roman communities
inside the frontiers; then, these romanized communities saved the empire.
This example shows the role that imagination plays when pursuing social
justice and common welfare, despite divisions based on race, gender,
religious faith, and political affiliation. Legal systems that forbid
segregation cannot sustain circumstances that invoke segregation as a
matter of culture and education. In this way, an extended citizenship created
to solve the problems of factual inequalities opens the door to other rights,
thus creating a highly stratified society born from the concentration of
wealth. Though London can demonstrate the success of an open ruling
class,12 there is little chance for low-income or underclass residents of
immigrant descent to gain access to the vested rights of the British
Constitution. The actual debate on Britishness exposes the challenges in
defining what it means to be British, where multiculturalism expands in a
society thought to be founded on common culture, religion, and race.13
However, egalitarianism basically depends on education mediated by the
economic conditions of those who teach and those who they educate.14 The
liberal tradition based on equal access to education has come to an end.
Education depends on the material conditions of schools, colleges,
universities, teachers, professors, and students; access to quality education
depends more on the costs a family can afford than on the legal rights given
to all individuals. That is why faith in egalitarianism cannot solve current
problems. In a certain way, it is a utopian solution for social conflicts, and
the nostalgia of paradise. The French Revolution portrayed egalitarianism
as a way to overcome social and natural inequalities and give access to a
common and extended wealth, a path to freedom from all kinds of serfdom,
and a fulfillment of social justice, without realizing that even utopian
societies founded on egalitarianism could not escape hierarchy and social
control. The “conspiracy of the equals” during the French Revolution was
cruelly suffocated. Nowadays, tolerance—praised as the modern means to a
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peaceful community—replaces egalitarianism ideals. This is why the former
depends on the latter, and the reason why if tolerance is not achieved it is
because egalitarianism could not succeed.
A second common source of resolution is the establishment of formal
freedoms, such as the right to education and the right to free speech. These
vested rights sought to prevent revolutions and show a break with the state’s
former regime, framing through political and judicial decisions the limits of
tolerated dissent.15 By supporting the state’s power and reducing the
possibility of serious conflicts, these legal freedoms came to represent an
essential element of any state’s survival.16 England is a good example of
how a ruling class can suppress violent revolts against a monarchy. The
success of the British ruling class lies in her capacity to combine
traditionalism and empiricism, the former by the aristocracy and the latter
by the bourgeoisie—two issues that could not be joined after the French
Revolution by France’s new ruling class.17
A third common source of resolution is the use of legalism to assure a
nonviolent and timely resolution of disputes between individuals. This
process fits hand-in-hand with the bourgeoisie’s aspiration of expanding
and guaranteeing commercial exchanges and agreements.18 The rule of law
also guaranteed a due process of law for those accused before a tribunal.
The codification process initiated by Prussia and France in the eighteenth
century established a set of legal rules to solve daily legal problems. Their
legal codes—thought of as a permanent legal system—had to be reformed
due to the rapidly evolving interests and desires of society, mainly due to
the outcomes of industrial progress, the advancement of technology, the
colonial experience, and the effects of socialist ideology. These are some of
the reasons why the new transnational elite encourages ample formal
freedoms to individuals while creating a transitional rule of law that protects
business in spite of the country where the business takes place.
A fourth common source of resolution for the mega-metropolis is the use
of parliamentarism as a form of open political participation. The
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establishment of certain democratic norms gives every citizen the right to be
elected to a government office, though these norms mask the governance of
the oligarchies.19 Parliamentarism is founded on an imaginary society where
all citizens can participate and discuss the main issues of government. It can
be said that this imaginary society has its precedent in Athens, but two
issues are often forgotten: most of Athens’ inhabitants were not citizens,
and the city was not overpopulated. In our time, legal norms are the
outcome of negotiations where few individuals debate or profit from the
enactment of the law itself. On the one hand, lobbying provides the means
to gain political and economic advantages in a competing space. On the
other hand, the time and costs associated with these negotiations can only
be supported with information and money—two elements that are not in the
hands of most citizens.
A fifth common source of resolution is the use of educational colonialism
to support a hierarchy of values based on the possession of wealth. Such a
system creates a hierarchy of sciences as a result of the interests of the
ruling class. It also establishes a corresponding hierarchy of human
activities where the most economically successful activities are the most
valued, thus assuring that these areas of knowledge are well transmitted and
disseminated.20 England, and France to a lesser extent, demonstrated how
the conscientiousness of education was a means to obtain national loyalty.
The different administration of knowledge by distinguishing “education at
home” and “education abroad” proved to be useful to limit access to full
education to colonial members of the empire. “Education at home” was a
prize for colonial elites, in the same way postgraduate education in the U.S.
is a prize for Latin American elites.
These characteristics, whose enumeration is not exhaustive, show a
peculiar ambivalence. One of the main characteristics of contemporary
cultures is that most of their constituent elements have contradictory effects.
Too many rights can be seen as a legal advantage for every individual; but
at the same time, rights collide with rights—free speech with religious
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creeds, labor with private life, and so on. Egalitarianism can protect
subjectivity but it also enlarges egotism. Formal freedoms are truly a legal
conquest, though their material conditions can deprive them of their
effectiveness. Legalism does not stand as a barrier to totalitarian regimes;
constitutions can enforce inequalities. Parliamentarism is a useful institution
when it offers solutions to real problems and controls governmental offices,
but it can negate or postpone solutions when oligarchies have control of
them. Educational colonialism, while bringing access to basic and necessary
knowledge, can reduce the possibilities of alternative conceptions by
rejecting non-majoritarian points of view. However, as this paper will
shortly explain, these dualities should not be insurmountable obstacles for
explaining why they are the relevant elements in the construction of
Imperial Cities.

III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CITIZENSHIP
At first glance, Rome may be considered the earliest model of an
Imperial City. However, an in-depth appreciation of Rome’s history shows
important differences between this ancient metropolis and its present-day
counterparts. While Rome is similar to modern Imperial Cities in that
affluence and noble birth were not the only means of attaining upper-class
status, Roman culture still did not mitigate its conception of citizenship. In
the modern world, citizenship is no longer a prerequisite for national
identity and personal prosperity as it was in Rome, because different classes
of “citizenship” have emerged. This section will explain why this
stratification of citizenship is of such benefit to the Imperial City elite.
Perhaps most importantly, Rome did not hesitate to establish a solid
barrier against citizenship for foreigners or slaves. Access to magistracy
was closed to the plebeian population. But after the plebeian revolts during
the republic, they had their own magistracy. Ironically, slaves were to have
important roles within the Roman Empire, mainly as a result of slave
rebellions.21 In some cases, many of them became rich men or were able, as
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freed men, to distinguish themselves as imperial officials.22 In addition,
mixed marriages between foreigners and citizens allowed rich plebeians
access to the nobility caste, an arrangement that seemed to satisfy the need
of upward social mobility for the sake of the nobility’s long-term survival.23
Consequently, affluence and noble birth were not the only means to upward
social mobility. Last, acknowledgement should be made of the wellestablished role played by eunuchs in the upper realms of the Roman social
hierarchy, who could ascend to high dignities but could not be emperors.24
These apparent contradictions in Roman culture must be understood as
practical solutions for the daily conflicts that emerged from the expansion
of the empire. Nowadays, they might be difficult to justify because modern
legal education thinks first of norms and then of practical consequences.
Second, the extension of citizenship was a process that opened the gates
to dynamic social mobility. Rome did not seek to altogether eliminate the
specific character of its rival cities; many of its enemies signed treaties in
order to preserve their own cultural, political, and social structures.25 The
culture Rome helped to create was ultimately the result of its willingness to
embrace outside cultures: romanitas is a term that describes the integration
of diverse ways of life thought to be relevant to the empire.26 These three
aspects (the cultural, political, and social structures) are useful in discerning
what modern Imperial Cities have in common with Rome’s earlier model,
as well as how they differ. Imperial Rome was born from factual conflicts
and needs; the construction of a common destiny was the goal of a ruling
class who knew how to adapt political institutions to the needs of the
empire. In contrast, Imperial Cities seek their own destiny in spite of the
state where they are located; the transnational ruling class only has a shared
welfare. There is no ideology or religious creed to support their identity,
only their praise of wealth and of consumerism. Perhaps this is not the last
stage of capitalism, but rather a symbol of a new kind of capitalism.
Modern citizenship, as it is read in legal norms and definitions, is an
essential attribute to individuals. But contrary to the ancient Roman norm of
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offering non-citizens opportunities to gain wealth and status, the modern
conception of citizenship has not opened the gates to dynamic and constant
upward social mobility. Although contemporary legal discourse emphasizes
legal citizenship as a relevant element for social mobility, different classes
of “citizenship” have emerged, representing an erosion of citizenship as a
prerequisite for national identity and personal prosperity.27
This condition is the result of two sets of circumstances—one legal and
the other practical. First is the extension and specification of legal rights
regardless of one’s citizenship, meaning that every resident of the state has
an equal possibility to benefit from them. In other words, entitlement to
these rights does not derive from the status of citizenship. What is instead
required is a set of extra qualities that are foreclosed from most individuals,
wealth being the most important. Wealth creates a strict membership
through varied structures of dominance such as education and labor; each
member is given a number of rights whose actual possession cannot be
inherited. Instead, possession depends on actual wealth and on one’s
personal aptitude to survive economic and financial crises. Thus, the
effectiveness of rights relies more on personal conditions than on general
conditions, an inherently contradictory situation which most contemporary
legal systems would like to assume is a temporary failure.
The second set of factors contributing to this modern erosion of
citizenship emerges from practical obstacles, such as an overall lack of
wealth, poor public education, and local forms of discrimination. Factors
such as these lead to a fragmentation of rights because they breed a system
of inherited and informal differentiation in citizenship—the more you have
the more you enjoy, the less you have the less you enjoy. Thus, discreet
forms of exile are born, such as the loss of one’s labor or one’s poor quality
of formal education, both of which diminish the entitlement and awareness
of citizenship and rights. Although there was no formal division between
slaves and freedmen/freedwomen, many current social circumstances reflect
the worst of this ancient division. Without firm recognition of these
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boundaries, not only does the underclass suffer from partial citizenship,
they remain unaware of their inferior status and the resulting structure of
dominance. Imperial Cities require this social division, and this situation
can only be created through the legal system.
This structure of dominance, facilitated by leading legal norms,
emphasizes equality in order to mask the inequalities born from the rise of
the modern Imperial Cities. Likewise, legal discourse adequately defines the
extent of these social conflicts by explaining why the present situation as a
whole cannot be reformed.28 Hence, the ideal of egalitarianism faces the
separation between those whose have an effective and full citizenship and
those who share portions of it according to the amount of wealth they
possess.
Another consequence of the fragmentation of citizenship is the
fragmentation of identity.29 Though it is assumed that there is only one class
of citizenship, there is in fact more than one. The opportunity to integrate a
national (or metropolitan) identity disintegrates as differentiation between
citizens and immigrants grows and becomes accepted. What defines an
identity breaks into pieces when an individual is required to act with
different masks. These masks prove to be essential in order to live in
contemporary Imperial Cities. However, these masks are not needed by the
ruling elite, where an integrated identity is based on full and exquisite
consumption. A complete identity is a natural effect of the possession of
wealth.
The final outcome of these circumstances is the construction of a
stratified citizenship, in which the elite benefit from effective entitlement of
rights regardless of citizenship while the rest of the population maintains the
illusion of inclusive entitlement to rights. Those with inferior citizenship
often find themselves forced to adapt to a variety of social roles as a result
of the fragmented identity that accompanies their fragmented citizenship.
Only the elite are able to proceed through their day-to-day lives with full
political and psychological autonomy. These conditions can be supported
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only if the legal discourse confronts them as an inevitable and temporary
step to full egalitarianism.

IV. CAPITALISM’S DOMINANCE THROUGH THE LEGAL NORM
A study of current legal discourse shows the predominant role of the state
in the modern western tradition. This is the result of two key developments:
the capitalist worldview and the philosophical foundations of the
Illustration.30 I prefer to use this term, rather than Enlightenment, because it
gives relevance to the role of urban elite culture in modern times and
explains the appearance of mass culture as its opposite. While the capitalist
worldview established the predominance of economics in both everyday life
and in state policy, the Illustration created the new philosophical
foundations of modernity—endless progress and individual freedom from
all kinds of serfdom.31 Wealth is seen as an appropriate and worthy means
for familial stability and economic progress; its place within social values
illustrates the freedom of mind that was born in early capitalism. Andrew
Carnegie—one of the most important American financial moguls and a well
known philanthropist—wrote, “not evil, but good, has come to the race
from the accumulation of wealth by those who have the ability and energy
that produce it.”32 This notion principally signified the independence of
commercial and banking activities from theological and ethical limits, a
crucial transformation meant to elevate economics from its subordinated
role to one of independence and eventual supremacy.33 This change of mind
also helps to distinguish Imperial Cities from the cities of antiquity.
Such a crucial change of mind first occurred because of the debates that
arose in the late Middle Ages concerning the role of the merchant, the
condemnation of usury, and the fair price—all regulations that were subject
to theological and religious restrictions.34 These debates opened the mind to
a new valuation of commercial activity which was traditionally seen as
improper conduct for noble men, a point of view that can be traced back to
Plato.35 In fact, many philosophers have argued about the right to search for
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human sources of law and morality, independent of theological
considerations.36 The next influence on this transformation was the arrival
of the bourgeoisie, which needed not only theological and philosophical
foundations for its policies, but also legal justification. These requirements
were met in subsequent eras by the religious reformers, who often advanced
their religious missions along the same supply chains forged by
merchants.37 Further philosophical support was afforded by the
contractarian theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.38
These two lines of philosophical thought gave rise to the conception of
law as it existed three centuries ago.39 Law, as it was conceived, was
intended to bring a formal and pre-established solution to daily conflicts;
legal systems were intended to be a means of peaceful resolution to major
social problems.40 While the law projected the goal of achieving good and
just outcomes, laws were construed to favor capitalism. Capitalism is a
significant element in Imperial Cities’ economic policy, sharing a
particularly close relationship between its legal and economic systems as
was demonstrated by Marx. This relationship can be seen in fields like
higher education and labor division.41 Higher education can provide the
academic foundations of social and economic inequalities by limiting the
debate on the present status quo, which is why Marx emphasized
nonconformist points of views in order to alter the present social order.
Unequal education cannot support individual upward mobility through work
because it deprives individuals of useful tools needed for social ascension.
In this way, legal systems were construed to settle interpersonal disputes
and to affirm the possession of property, require the acceptance of
capitalism, and guarantee a social order founded predominantly on the right
to hold private property. Legal norms and codes—especially the civil code
derived from the French Revolution—ensured this legal conception in the
Old and the New World. The French civil code dealt heavily with
matrimony and property, two issues relevant to Napoleon which are
similarly prevalent throughout Latin America.42 Facts reveal that the legal
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process’s best outcome usually relies on full-time and well-paid lawyers,
another way in which capitalism controls access to the law.43 The resolution
of economic legal disputes, even in underdeveloped countries, is an
affirmation of the prevalence of this wealth-driven conception of justice.
Judges tend to be conservative, acting on behalf of the existing social and
moral order.44 The values they enforce through legal norms are the ones
they, in their private lives, claim to be the right ones.45 They do not
challenge the existing political, social, and moral order. In this way, judges
act as guardians of the written law enacted by the political oligarchies that
continue to rule most nations.
The visible inequalities of judicial decisions increase the demands for just
outcomes, but differentiated citizenship prevents this demand from reaching
a point of critical mass. History teaches that money can not only purchase
freedom, but can also protect it. Conversely, the absence of personal wealth
opens the road to human serfdom.46 This occurs because laws and moral
norms are targeted towards the goals of the affluent society, which today
means capitalism.

V. IN THE END, ALL IS CONSUMERISM
No word can better describe the context of today’s urban culture than
“consumerism.” During the Renaissance, the prestige of wealth grew
because of the firm belief that money led to social value, the functions it
could perform, and the needs it could satisfy.47 Consumption revealed
individual and collective power. Thus, luxury became a social measure for
individual success: the more you have, the more you can spend. Though
there was a tendency to save, in the end, consumption prevailed as the
reigning social value. As a consequence, contemporary thinkers argue that
full citizenship is predominantly achieved by gaining open access to goods
and rights—crucial to individuals who aspired to be Roman citizens.48 The
following section will focus on this conception of wealth as a measurement
of one’s worth as a citizen.
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If we trace the path back to this conception, a Latin term can be found—
fortuna. Fortuna was associated with predestination, but not in the biblical
sense. Its importance in human life, especially in explaining the success of
human activities, proved to be essential to the foundations of social
Darwinism and biological positivism.49 To the man of the Middle Ages,
wealth meant the possession of land; meanwhile to the man of the sixteenth
century it meant the possession of money.50 The axis of the economy passed
from one whose main interest was expenditure to one whose main interest
was income.
Related to this new concept of life is the assertion that success is essential
to human life, though it is not conceived as an equal condition of all human
beings. Social Darwinism is thought to be the suitable heir of this
conception. So today, while we are concerned by the culture of success in
which we live, we must remind ourselves that success is merely the
contemporary manifestation of fortuna. Associated with this idea is a
popular concept: the struggle for life. This concept, translated to political
terms, means fighting, rivalry, and strong competition, where wealth is the
main result and defeat means to be out of the competition. In brief, the
struggle for life is the result of the capitalist mindset, which emerged as a
movement supporting the independence of mind and conduct, as well as the
dominion over nature and society through the possession of wealth.
Now we have the context for the complete profile of the citizen;
consumerism and citizenship are interchangeable terms. Thus, the teachings
of Plato remain true: states are merely a manifestation of man because the
state grows out of human individuals; the former are the reflection of the
latter.51 Thus, if individuals and the state praise the possession of wealth,
education will do the same. This peculiar structure of dominance tragically
assures there will be no change in the future and there will be no alternative
way of living.52 By making every citizen a consumer, we go from a republic
of citizens to a republic of consumers. Appreciating this subtle revolution is
crucial to comprehending our contemporary history.
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VI. THE NEED FOR IMPERIAL CITIES AND ROLE OF INFORMATION
History teaches that conquests by war or alliances by treaties were often
done to empower nations. The drive to expand power across the world was
done not only to preserve and expand wealth but also to bring peace so as to
increase and guarantee commercial ties, mainly along a nation’s or city’s
borders.53 Only the processes of national unification put cities under one
sovereign; the federal power turned out to be the basis of those unions.54
On one hand, this process of unification and federalism reveals the
increasing relevance of the Imperial Cities, especially in the context of
commerce. This is one reason why we see modern history as a history of
cities, more than what is seen in ancient Greece or Rome. Many cities have
gained importance because of trade, the proximity of harbors, or geographic
position. Wealth was created predominantly by the activities of merchants
and bankers.55 It is important to note that many Imperial Cities were not
centers for the production of goods. The role they performed was more
often directly devoted to the principal activities of the markets located
within their borders: loaning, saving, selling, and purchasing.56
This shift in focus from industrial production to commercial trade
demonstrated a change in the axis of political power. The orders of the old
society were transformed into classes defined by their relationship with
wealth.57 This redefinition of class represented an independence from the
clergy and the old nobility and what they represented. Therefore, cities
became a place where wealth could expand without any religious or legal
restrictions and where this new conception of class was cultivated. This
development put economics on the top of scientific discovery because
economics could help the cities progress.58 The economic doctrines born
with the rising bourgeoisie paved the way to the subsequent industrial
revolution and to capitalism.59 The reduction of costs resulting from the
Industrial Revolution was crucial; by establishing new ways of economic
production, human labor tended, in the long run, to experience better
conditions, high wages, and an extension of the benefits that once were only
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available to the nobility and the bourgeoisie. The control over the economic
processes influenced the national and international perspective of states,
particularly those with access to major maritime shipping channels.
Information is of vital importance to a society establishing new methods
of economic production because it reveals the present and probable
performance of the markets. Information about things to come is a
commodity itself. If there were a way to improve wealth, it is through
information, which is why insider trading is irrepressible in spite of ethical
and legal judgment. In this way, the collection of information is a useful
tool to improve one’s personal chances to win.
However, it is an illusion to state the more information you have the less
risk you possess. Because nature’s regularities can be altered by the action
of human beings, the indeterminacy of nature’s conduct is more the rule
than the exception. Hence, although risks derived from nature can be
foretold, they can also be unpredictable. The same can be said of human
conduct. Regardless, the more information you have about natural and
human conduct, the more predictable they become. For example, although
collective conduct is still free from precise prediction or patterns of
explanation, economic and political crises can be foreseen.
Information, being a means to success, requires the entitlement of
fundamental rights to obtain it.60 Roman law had an extended classification
of types of citizenship, according to its political priorities. Conversely, now,
instead of classifications of citizenship we have an extended classification
of access to information, which in fact differentiates more than the Roman
norms did. Information is a relevant instrument to power and consequently
to the enjoyment of rights. In this context, information makes it possible to
prevent future losses or failures but requires having the time and wealth to
purchase it, as well as the education to comprehend it. Time efficiency is
protected by having centralized places where information is collected, and
technological instruments through which to collect it. Essentially, wealth
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has been preserved by daily newsletters that have informed the elite about
the political and economic conditions of the states.
To avert bad financial outcomes and to mitigate the poor performance of
the markets, states employed several incentives to locate their economic and
financial hubs in Imperial Cities; accordingly, Imperial Cities’ importance
grew. Positioning economic and financial hubs within the borders of
Imperial Cities gave these cities the power to influence state policy and also
guaranteed long-term stability for the members of the ruling class; though,
it could be taken as a necessary condition of them as economic crises still
arose. These circumstances gave birth to new forms of oligarchies, which
relied on the mask of the republica in order to endure. The Janus-faced
formula proved to be useful, at least for the present situation.

VII. THE IMPERIAL CITIES CHALLENGE THE MYTH OF THE
REPUBLICA
The governance of Imperial Cities is a particularly crucial question for
three reasons. First, affluent people, as a ruling class, expand freedom on
the one hand, while making it more exclusive on the other. This is a kind of
political and social safety net in the face of possible future disturbances.
Ultimately, the rich govern through an extended oligarchy in spite of the
constant universal praise of democracy. Freedom is expansive because the
ruling oligarchy recognizes some basic liberties in order to establish a
minimum of social peace. For example, Roman emperors recognized some
basic liberties in order to maintain social peace, though the success of this
policy was limited for subsequent empires61—as was mentioned in the case
of England and the debate on Britishness. Migrants as a whole do not share
common values unless they are obliged to. They want to keep their own
traditions, to be “at home” within foreign boundaries or territories.
Second, recognized freedoms are more exclusive than they were in past
ages; therefore, understanding how to dissolve the Imperial City elite will
hopefully lead to the expansion and broadening of rights regardless of class
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and consumption. If legal freedoms are somehow restricted, rich citizens
have better opportunities to overcome the restriction than the poor.
Randolph S. Bourne, a controversial American intellectual of the nineteenth
century, explained that:
If freedom means the right to do pretty much as one pleases, so
long as one does not interfere with others, the immigrant has found
freedom, and the ruling element has been singularly liberal in its
treatment of the invading hordes. But if freedom means a
democratic cooperation in determining the ideals and purposes and
industrial and social institutions of a country, then the immigrant
has not been free.62
This quote explains the need for education in relation to freedom and the
political superiority of the educated, especially in a newly-developed land.
Third, it should be considered that celebrating the possession of wealth
emerged and spread from the Anglo-Saxon culture,63 although, as we have
noted, this attitude’s foundation is rooted in the Renaissance. The
celebration of wealth has led to the idea that the primary goal of wealth is to
reduce the possibility of conflicts. As Russell H. Conwell, founder of
Temple University and a wealthy Baptist minister, once wrote, “Love is the
grandest thing on God’s earth, but fortunate the lover who has plenty of
money. Money is power: money has powers; and for a man to say, ‘I do not
want money,’ is to say, ‘I do not wish to do any good to my fellowmen.’”64
However, the real and daily struggle for wealth cannot stop the rise of
poverty and social inequalities. Within the affluent cities, where façade of
upward social mobility prevails, the necessity of wealth negates such
opportunity. But while domestic peace might be maintained, the pursuit of
wealth increases the possibility of struggle outside of a nation’s borders;
most modern wars are the result of the desire for the economic control of
the production of goods or commodities. That is why we cannot speak
anymore of society; social and economic gaps divide its members more than
in ages where slavery and differentiated citizenship were legally
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established. Solid barriers have been construed in order to preserve proper
spaces of freedom and to restrict where poor quarters exist—the villas
miserias of Argentina or favelas of Brazil, for example.65 This informal yet
physical division of citizens is accepted by the affluent elite and determines
who rules Imperial Cities and what kind of community can be constructed.
The division between citizens alters the shape of most of these cities,
essentially making them more divided than Greek or Roman cities were.
Unfortunately, the next step of the elites is likely to enlarge these
divisions outside of the cities: the struggle for imperial power. Lenin
commented that the enormous growth of industry and the remarkably rapid
concentration of production in ever-larger enterprises were two of the most
characteristic features of capitalism,66 and that imperialism emerged as a
direct continuation of these characteristics.67 He then added that
“Imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the
dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established.”68 In brief,
from their position, Imperial Cities make decisions that influence local and
foreign economic processes through information about finance and capital
markets, two critical elements to the capitalist system. These elements are
also the basic components of empowerment for this kind of city. This kind
of inner structure cannot be compared with that of the ancient cities we took
as historical examples.
However, some similarities do appear between modern Imperial Cities
and their ancient counterparts. The modern ruling class is transnational—an
alternative description could be an association of local oligarchies—like the
oligarchies who first ruled Greek cities and then the late Roman republic;69
however, the modern ruling class cannot be taken as a revival of these
ancient oligarchies. Modern oligarchies are masked with the façade of
democracy—a faked democracy that still attracts and permits a limited
satisfaction of freedoms. This is evident from the content of the
contemporary political narrative; genuine quarrels within the inner circles of
power do not rely on race, religion, political affiliation, or gender. They rest
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on the determination of who is entitled to exert this masked power.70 Thus,
the daily fight for rights is limited to the rest of the population, where there
is no chance of full satisfaction; rather, the elite’s antagonism towards those
fighting for rights preserves the status quo because there will always be a
new right to claim.
Basically, microstates and Imperial Cities can function without a formal
independence from the territory within which they find themselves. This
process conceptualizes the inclusion of the global into the national as a
partial and incipient de-nationalization of elements of the national
identity.71 This means that, while Imperial Cities are subject to states’
dominance, the cities’ elite act as if they were really autonomous.
Autonomy is the essential aspect of self-government and for the Imperial
Cities represents the end of the republican theory of nationhood.72 It is the
proper way to self-govern when the burden of the cities’ decisions rest far
beyond their limits, while the profits remain close to them. Additionally,
although local political constitutions are still a chart of fundamental rights
and freedoms, their content tends to be transnationalized, giving more legal
protection to the prominent citizens of the Imperial Cities and the
corporations they own regardless of location or residence. These conditions
have costs, conflicts, winners, and losers. Hence, when a financial crisis
occurs, the state is the biggest loser because markets make their own
corrections by letting losers go and winners take all. The supremacy of the
political class obliges them to affirm the results of this crisis through the
enactment of statutes that the legal system holds as a posteriori—just
rewards for the ones who have enough fortuna. As Lawrence Friedman
stated, “social forces do not ‘make’ law directly. First, they pass through the
screen of legal culture.”73
As it was noted in preceding paragraphs, the way culture is produced
limits or enlarges the goals of the society. Ideals and social values advance
a certain point of view, which is why education and the administration of
knowledge is a crucial issue for the ruling class. For Imperial Cities, legal
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culture controlled by the wealthy is a means to control conflicts derived
from poverty and social inequalities.
In the end, the only winner is the ruling oligarchy that must abandon
some of her members and preserve the ones who are able to survive. This
circumstance conceals the passive acceptance of predestination; wealth or
poverty is not a human choice. No one can foretell the road to wealth, even
if it is closed or restricted. The primacy of economical forces does the filthy
work. In this sense, Marx reminds us that money can get what he as a man
cannot.74 Therefore, what is worthy is what leads to the accumulation of
wealth and to the cultural hegemony of capitalism.
Schools of business perpetuate the capitalist model;75 the ideals of
capitalism can only be assured through currents of thought and institutions
like business schools, because they tend to reproduce the capitalist system
outside of the Imperial Cities. That is why contemporary imperialism can
use peaceful means to preserve the power of the Imperial Cities. Sassen
asserts that “[t]here is a specific kind of materiality underlying the world of
new business activities even if they take place partly in electronic space . . .
firms’ activities are simultaneously partly deterritorialized and partly deeply
territorialized, they span the globe yet they are highly concentrated in very
specific places.”76 In sum, what Sassen exposes is the sort of power the
Imperial Cities have—deterritorialized power. Deterritorialized power
offers less risk than the traditional power structure, mostly because
transnational economics and legal norms reduce the consequences of
national political disturbances. Nevertheless, economic risk cannot be fully
eradicated, for “no amount of increased information, transparency or
supervision can prevent recurrent ‘runs,’ and panics in stock and bond
markets, property markets or currency markets.”77 Even when the
shareholders of wealth can protect themselves across frontiers by
establishing invisible legal and economical borders, they cannot totally
escape from the consequences of the markets. Consequently, the existence
of Imperial Cities represents the end of republican governance; and as
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republican governance weakens more every day, these cities rise as an
outstanding feature of this century.
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